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MANAGEMENT RIGHTS AND SUBCONTRACTING
JOHN E. BURNS*
If we were a magician and could peer into a crystal ball and read the
future, what would we see in the shadowland of managerial prerogatives?
Undoubtedly a further shrinking and withering!
The handwriting is already clearly on the wall in large letters and
bold face type, stenciled in indelibly in two cases of potentially far-
reaching decisions of National Labor Relations Board-Fibreboard
Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB;' and Town and Country Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB.' These two cases have caused strong repercussions in manage-
ment circles.
Other cases, of course, cast their shadows of various intensities, too,
and there are likewise some cases which bring traces of sunshine into the
penumbra. We shall direct attention to these in the latter part of this
article.
It is generally recognized that unions have made their greatest pene-
tration into the management rights area in connection with the personnel
function. This is natural because the union voice in management is
strongest in matters such as hiring, layoff, discharge, number of em-
ployees, promotion, wages, discipline, and hours of work. And now sub-
contracting is being added to the list.
It is obvious that, if a union participates in policy making decisions,
such as pertaining to the financing, expansion, or contraction of the plant,
the addition of new products, and the equipment to be used, the union
is actually participating in directing the company and it is reasonable to
say that the right to subcontract is likewise a question of management
policy.
Seldom, however, does the union aggressively seek an equal partner-
ship role in major management policy matters. Rather, the union endeavors
to get the employer to agree to give it a voice in policy matters like es-
tablishing work rules, transferring employees, changing work jobs, mov-
ing employees from job to job, allocating overtime, assigning of jobs, and
disciplining or discharging employees.
TOWN AND COUNTRY MFG. CO.
In substance what the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals sustained in
upholding the NLRB decision in Town and Country Mfg. Co. are the fol-
lowing points:
* B.S., University of Illinois; M.BA., 1951, University of Chicago; J.D., 1943, Loyola
University School of Law. Member of the Illinois Bar. Associate Professor, Department of
Management, De Paul University.
1. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
2. 316 F.2d 846 (1963).
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1. That the employer, a mobile home manufacturer, was motivated by
an anti-union bias in subcontracting out work (its hauling opera-
tions of the mobile homes) which was normally performed by its
own employees in the collective bargaining unit. These truck driver
employees were laid off-and this was an unfair labor practice.
2. That even an economically motivated employer in making changes
in his method of operations affecting employee job tenure must bar-
gain on the effect upon employees of subcontracting out bargain-
ing unit work.
3. That the actual change in working conditions considered as a uni-
lateral change in wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment was unlawful.
4. That the employer's decision to subcontract bargaining unit work
is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.
Points 1, 2 and 3 are not really new. Other cases have posed similar
issues and have had similar holdings. But Point 4 is a radical change.
It is new and novel and without precedent! Probably, the decision of
the U.S. Supreme Court in Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago
Northwestern R.R. Co.' showed the handwriting on the wall. In that
case, the Supreme Court held that the Chicago and Northwestern Rail-
way was obligated to bargain with the union on the elimination of cer-
tain station agent jobs. The Railway was ordered to bargain not just
on the effect of the eliminationi of the jobs, but on the right itself to
eliminate the jobs.
FIBREBOARD PAPER PRODUCTS CORP.
Following its decision in Town and Country, a reconstituted NLRB
Board reopened and reversed its decision in Fibreboard Paper Products
Co. to bring it in line with the new doctrine that subcontracting of unit
work in and of itself is a mandatory subject of bargaining. The U.S. Su-
preme Court has upheld the Board in this case as previously stated. In
the original Fibreboard decision, the Board in a three way split, had held
that since there was no evidence of union discrimination but only eco-
nomic reasons for the subcontracting it was not a mandatory subject for
collective bargaining-only the effects of the subcontracting was a bar-
gainable issue.4
Briefly, the facts in the Fibreboard case are:
1. Fibreboard unilaterally subcontracted its maintenance work with-
3. 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
4. In the original Fibreboard decision, Chairman Frank W. McCullock and Member
Gerald A. Brown took no part. They were appointed to the NLRB by President Kennedy
in 1961.
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out any bargaining with the union (the steelworkers) on this
point.
2. Fibreboard was motivated solely by economic reasons-the saving
of $225,000 annually-and there was no anti-union bias on the part
of the employer.
3. Fibreboard notified the union four days prior to the expiration of
the existing contract that since all inside maintenance work would
be subcontracted to an independent contractor there was no point
in negotiating a new contract because the present maintenance em-
ployees would be replaced by the contractor's employees.
4. Fibreboard did bargain with the union on the question of termina-
tion rights of the discharged employees.
5. On the basis of its decision in Town and County Mfg. Co. and the
U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Railroad Telegraphers5 case
the reconstituted NLRB reversed its original finding and held that
Fibreboard's action was an unfair labor practice.
6. The Board ordered Fibreboard to cease and desist from unilaterally
subcontracting bargaining unit work or otherwise making unilateral
changes in its employees' terms and conditions of employment
without consulting the union.
7. The Board further ordered Fibreboard to restore the status quo
ante by reinstituting its maintenance operation and fulfilling its
statutory obligation to bargain with the union on subcontracting
the unit maintenance work.
8. The Board pointed out that after the obligation to bargain had been
satisfied, following the resumption of bargaining, Fibreboard would
be free lawfully to subcontract its maintenance work if it desired
to do so.
THE LARGER PICTURE
In the 1964 fiscal year of the NLRB, about 175 cases in which the
Town and Country and the Fibreboard principle was involved came to
the NLRB. In almost half of the cases the charges were dismissed, in
about half of them complaints were authorized, and, in a few cases fur-
ther proceedings were deferred pending the parties resort to grievance
and arbitration procedures under their collective bargaining contracts.
The question presented in most of the cases was whether the employer
had fulfilled his bargaining obligations by giving the union sufficient ad-
vance notice and an opportunity to bargain on the employer's decision
5. Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago Northwestern R.R. Co., 362 U.S. 330
(1960).
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to subcontract or otherwise remove work from the bargaining unit. A
correlative question was whether the union had timely requested bar-
gaining with respect to such decisions.
SOME NLRB DECISIONS FAVORABLE TO MANAGEMENT ON
SUBCONTRACTING
In Shell Oil Co.,6 the NLRB has held that if the employer's contract
with the union provides he has a right to subcontract work without prior
consultation with the union he does not need to give any advance notice
nor bargain on the question.
In Westinghouse Electric Corp.7 the Board held that the Town and
Country and Fibreboard principles did not apply. The reason was that
since the early 1940's at the Mansfield, Ohio plant involved there had
been continuous subcontracting. Accordingly, in 1963, when the company,
without any consultation with the union, let out about 400 maintenance
subcontracts, 800 subcontracts for tools and dies, and about 5000 sub-
contracts for component parts, the NLRB held this was the company's
usual and customary way of doing business; it had no adverse effect on
employees and was motivated solely by economic reasons. The Board
noted that the union had unsuccessfully sought restrictions on subcon-
tracting in 1958, 1960 and 1963 bargaining negotiations.
In Fafnir Bearing Co.,8 the employer had for many years contracted
out maintenance work, the union was well aware of this and had never
before questioned it. The Board ruled that the employer's unilateral sub-
contracting of the work represented no change in the "conditions of
employment" of employees in the maintenance unit and dismissed the
union complaint. The Board pointed out that the union never sought in
its collective bargaining negotiations any restrictions on the employer's
established subcontracting practices. Furthermore, the Board noted that
the contract contained a broad management rights clause which reserved
exclusively to the employer the right to change its "methods or processes,"
"to determine the extent to which the plants shall be operated," and "to
transfer any employees subject only to such factors as seniority."
In Superior Coach Corp.,9 the Board held that there was no unfair
labor practice in the employer's failure to bargain with the union before
hiring an independent contractor to install a new wash system and to re-
place the plant's heating system with a new one. Such action on the part
of the employer, the Board decided, was consistent with past practices
and it had no adverse affect on unit employees.
6. 149 N.L.R.B. 283 (1964). Also see General Motors Corp., 149 N.L.R.B. 396 (1964).
7. 150 N.L.R.B. 1574 (1965).
8. Fafnir Bearing Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 332 (1965).
9. 151 N.L.R.B. 188 (1965).
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In the New York Mirror ° case in March, 1965, the NLRB by a 4-0
vote turned down union charges against the Hearst Corporation for
selling and shutting down the newspaper without first discussing its de-
cision to do so with the many unions representing the 1600 employees of
the newspaper.
The Board cited the Supreme Court statement in NLRB v. Katz" to
the effect that even though unilateral action by an employer without prior
discussion with the union is contrary to Congressional policy, this does
not foreclose the possibility that there might be circumstances which the
Board could or should accept as excusing or justifying such unilateral
action.
The Board stated that, "We are satisfied that such circumstances are
present here," and pointed out that:
1. The employer action was prompted solely by economic factors.
2. The sale and shutdown permanently abolished all bargaining unit
jobs and no party to the case had sought restoration of the jobs
and reinstatement of the employees.
3. Contracts signed following the 113 day city wide newspaper strike
in 1963 contained "employees' severance pay and termination rights
in the event of abolishment of unit jobs."
4. The publisher and unions had a long and effective bargaining rela-
tionship leading up to the last contract.
5. Hearst continued the bargaining relationship after the shutdown by
meeting and negotiating with the unions whenever requested.
6. The union's primary and virtually sole concern after the shutdown
was securing the employees' rights under the contract and the
company met its obligation to bargain with the union concerning
those rights and other effects of the shutdown, negotiating to full
and complete settlement the employees' severance pay and co-op-
eration in efforts to find other employment for them.
7. The Board found no evidence the employer had any hostility to the
unions involved.
GENERAL AND EXCLUSIVE MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
Arthur J. Goldberg, presently U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations,
spoke on Management's Reserved Rights: A Labor View at the 1956 An-
nual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators. Here are some of
10. 151 N.L.R.B. 834 (1965).
11. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
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his statements made at the time he was general counsel of the United
Steelworkers."2
Not only does management have the general right to man-
age the business, but many agreements provide that manage-
ment has the exclusive right to direct working forces and usually
to lay off, recall, discharge, etc.
The right to direct, where it involves wages, hours, or working
conditions is a procedural right. It is a recognition of the fact
that somebody must be boss; somebody has to run the plant.
People can't be running around at loose ends each deciding what
to do next. Management decides what the employee is to do.
However, this right to direct or to initiate action does not imply
a second class role for the union. The union has the right to pur-
sue its role of representing the interest of the employee with
the same stature accorded it as is accorded management. To as-,
sure order, there is a clear procedural line drawn: the company
directs and the union grieves when it objects.'"
Counsel for management would scarcely disagree with the above ex-
pression of belief.
Mr. Goldberg continued:
In addition to these exclusive rights to do things without any
union say, the exclusive rights to manage and direct should be
very clearly understood by all parties. The union cannot direct
its members to their work stations or work assignments. The
union does not tell people to go home because there is no work.
The union does not notify people who are discharged to stay
put. The union does not tell employees to report for work after
a layoff (except perhaps as an agent for transmitting informa-
tion in behalf of management). The union does not start or stop
operations unless perhaps some urgent safety matter is involved
and there is some contractual or other basis for such action.
This is not an easy concept. Very often union men are disturbed
by decisions they consider entirely wrong. Nevertheless, a com-
pany's right to make its own judgments is clear.'4
Mr. Goldberg also states:
Management determines the product, the machine to be used,
the manufacturing method, the price, the plant layout, the plant
organization, and innumerable other questions. These are re-
12. Goldberg, Management's Reserved Right: A Labor View in MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
AND THE ARBimAnoN PROCESS 118 (McKelvey, ed. 1956).
13. Id. at 120-21.
14. Id. at 124.
[Vol. 5:167
1966-1967] MANAGEMENT RIGHTS AND SUBCONTRACTING 173
served rights, inherent rights, exclusive rights which are not
diminished or modified by collective bargaining as it exists in in-
dustries such as steel. It is of great importance that this be
generally understood and accepted by all parties. Mature, co-
operative bargaining relationships require reliance on acceptance
of the rights of each party by the other. A company has got to
know it can develop a product and get it turned out; develop a
machine and have it manned and operated; devise a way to im-
prove a product and have the improvement made effective; es-
tablish prices, build plants, create supervisory forces and not
thereby become embroiled in a labor dispute.' 5
CONCLUSION
If both management and labor would study and reflect on Mr. Gold-
berg's statements, union-management relationships would inevitably im-
prove for the magic key is that management has the right to act and the
union has the right to challenge. A management which must first get
approval of the union before it acts has in fact made the union the princi-
pal directing force in the operation of the company.
This is why the decisions in Town and Country and Fibreboard Paper
Products are so disturbing. Because, in substance, these decisions require
management to bargain with the union before management can act to
subcontract work if such subcontracting would adversely affect employees
in the bargaining unit. These two cases establish the NLRB rule that sub-
contracting, leasing, or terminating work in the bargaining unit, which
will adversely affect employees, is a subject for mandatory bargaining
with the union regardless of the motive of the employer. There is, how-
ever, no requirement that agreement be reached with the union.
However, as the Shell Oil Co., the Westinghouse Electric Corp., the
Fafnir Bearing Co., the Superior Coach Corp., and the New York Mirror
cases show, the Town and Country and the Fibreboard principle probably
will not hold where:
1. A specific contract clause provides for a waiver of the mandatory
bargaining requirement in subcontracting;
2. Where the pattern of past practices may be such as to preclude
the necessity for mandatory bargaining on the employer's unilateral
decision to subcontract work; or
3. There may be such unusual circumstances that excuse or justify
unilateral subcontracting action by the employer.
In all such instances, however, perhaps the most important criterion
of the Board is that the employees in the bargaining unit not be adversely
15. Id. at 120-21.
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affected. It is evident, then, that Town and Country and Fibreboard are
not as broad and all inclusive as employers have feared. As a matter of
fact, it would appear that the employer's ordinary routine subcontracting
need not be submitted to union negotiation at all unless there is a likeli-
hood of an adverse impact upon bargaining unit employees.
